Reference ID: 09DOHA214
Created: 2009-03-26 13:01
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Doha
Stephen H Rogerson 12/02/2009 11:08:08 AM From DB/Inbox:
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S E C R E T DOHA 00214
CXDOHA:
ACTION: AMB
INFO: RSO RAO P/E OMC LEGATT DAO DCM
DISSEMINATION: AMB /1
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:JLABARON
DRAFTED: P/E:MZEBLEY
CLEARED: P/E: DFABRYCKY, P/E: RICE, DCM: MRATNEY
VZCZCDOI550
RR RUEHC RHMFISS RUEAIIA RHMFISS RULSSGG RHMFISS
RHEFDIA RHMFISS
DE RUEHDO #0214/01 0851341
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261341Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8904
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC//NNSA//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RULSSGG/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000214
NOFORN
S/CT FOR SHARRI R. CLARK AND BRUCE AVERILL NEA/ARP FOR MATT BLONG
DOE/NNSA FOR OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE U.S. COAST GUARD FOR
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY AND STEWARDSHIP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAG: PTER, PREL, PGOV, ECON, ETTC, EAID, EFIN, EAGR, ASEC, KCIP, ENRG,
QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: 2009 CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT
REF: A. SECSTATE 15113 B. DOHA 152 (08)
C. DOHA 75 (08) D. DOHA 311 (07)
Classified By: Amb. LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-----------------
(S/NF) KEY POINTS
-----------------
-- Post assesses that U.S. investments in Qatar's energy
industry, coupled with the onset of regular liquefied natural gas
(LNG) exports to the U.S. 2009-12, constitute the main critical
infrastructure and key resources in Qatar, which if destroyed,
disrupted or exploited might have an immediate and deleterious effect
on the United States.
-- Embassy Doha continues to engage Government of Qatar entities
across the spectrum to increase awareness and implement increased
security procedures to identify and protect critical infrastructure.
These entities include Qatar Petroleum and its Industrial Security
Directorate, the Ministry of Interior, and the Qatar Armed Forces.
-- Key Qatari officials have recently made overtures of their
willingness to embrace USG offers for assistance or requests for
information/transparency on their current vulnerabilities and
infrastructure protection programs. Embassy Doha assesses that there
is considerable scope for cooperation with the GOQ on this issue,
considerably more than at any time over the past three years.
-- Embassy Doha is currently preparing an interagency plan to engage
GOQ entities in a synchronized fashion on this issue. End Key
Points.
----------------------------
QATAR'S KEY ENERGY RESOURCES
----------------------------
¶1. (C) Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas field
in the world. Qatar's portion contains an estimated 900 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas, giving it the third-largest reserves of natural
gas in the world. Qatar is believed to have an agreement with
Iran providing a set extraction limit in the field; however, the
details of this arrangement are not known to us. By 2009,
Qatar's share of hydrocarbon revenue from natural gas and derivatives
was about equal to that derived from oil. At 30 metric tons per annum
(mta), Qatar is already the world leader in LNG exports. Current
estimates are that by 2012 Qatar will produce 77 million tons of LNG
annually, roughly a third of which Qatar hopes to export to the U.S.
market. About half of the new global LNG capacity coming online in the
next four years will be in Qatar. (Note: Per British Petroleum
calculations, 1 million metric tons of LNG equals 48.7 billion cubic
feet of natural gas.)
-----------------------------------
QATAR'S CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) There are three main industrial facilities of interest that
if destroyed, or if their production is disrupted, could have an
immediate effect on U.S. national economic security. In order of
priority, these are Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC), Mesaieed
Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, and Dukhan Industrial City.
All three industrial centers are under the control and supervision of
Qatar Petroleum (QP), a semi-autonomous government organization whose
Chairman, Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, is also the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Energy and Industry. Natural gas
production is primarily centered around the coast and offshore areas
in the northeast of Qatar, in and round Ras Laffan; while, oil
production is concentrated on the western coast near Dukhan as well as
offshore platforms.
¶3. (C) Ras Laffan is Qatar's flag-ship industrial center,
predominantly focused on the production of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
and derivative petrochemicals obtained during the natural gas
extraction process. Destruction or an attack disrupting
production at RLIC would cause exceptionally grave damage to the world
market and U.S. national economic security interests. As of
2008, Qatar LNG production for export to Japan and South Korean
represented over 60 percent of those respective countries internal
natural gas consumption; by 2012 a third of Qatari LNG produced could be
destined for the U.S. market, at which time it is estimated that Qatar
will be the largest source of imported LNG to the U.S. market. The
current drop in global demand for gas will also result in more LNG being
sent to the U.S. as the flexible market and storage capacity give the
U.S. the ability to soak up excess global supply in the short-term.
¶4. (C) QP operating units QatarGas and RasGas are responsible for
LNG production in Ras Laffan. QatarGas production trains three
and four will produce LNG equivalent to 2.8 billion cubic feet of gas
per day, and RasGas is currently building two trains at Ras Laffan
with 7.8 million tons of annual capacity each. ("Trains" are the
liquefaction plants which draw gas pumped at offshore platforms,
liquefy it, and load it onto LNG tankers.) These four trains
will be among the largest in the world, and their production will be
allocated in part to U.S. markets. In addition, major U.S.
energy companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips partner with
Qatar and currently have over $13 billion invested in Qatar's natural
gas industry. Therefore, Ras Laffan's importance as a critical
facility will continue to grow as production and exports to the U.S.
increase.
¶5. (S/NF) As of early 2009, Qatar Petroleum Industrial Security
Directorate has continued security infrastructure improvements at RLIC
and the expansive Ras Laffan Industrial City Port complex, after a
series of security assessments conducted since 2005 by several western
security firms. These improvements have included redesign and
construction of a new main entry control point for RLIC, plans for
redesign of existing port boundaries under the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS)
code, construction of a new port entry control point equipped with
radiological and nuclear material detection monitors and container
screening portals, and incorporation of ground-based radar,
overlapping CCTV coverage and biometric enabled identification.
¶6. (S/NF) Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, located
approximately 40 km south of Doha, was officially established in 1996
and is the main shipping point for oil from Dukhan to the
international market. Destruction or disruption of port services
would effectively shut down oil shipments from Qatar, potentially
affecting half of Qatar's petroleum revenue. In addition, the
port complex is a key choke point for U.S. and coalition military
equipment, munitions and bulk aviation fuel delivery to Al-Udeid Air
Base and Camp As Sayliyah, the two Qatari military installations hosting
U.S. Coalition forces. Any disruption to port operations would
severely limit U.S. military operations throughout the U.S. Central
Command AOR. As an example, in September-October 2007, strategic fuel
reserves at Al Udeid Airbase were depleted because unscheduled,
uncoordinated road construction caused increased transit time for fuel
tankers. The situation continued for 30 days until resolved. Had
the situation not been resolved, there would have been an impact on
theater-wide combat and airlift operations.
¶7. (C/NF) Mesaieed is also the location of most of Qatar's light,
medium and support petrochemical facilities; producing fertilizer,
fuel additives, lubricants, plastics and vinyl for domestic
consumption and export. The facility comprises four major
treatment plants as well as a specialized holding area to store and
export products. Natural Gas Liquids Plants 1 and 2 are designed
to separate and fractionate LNG extracted from various production
areas into a number of fractionated final products. Natural Gas
Liquids Plant 3 is composed of separate units to treat gas and
condensates, and plant 4 is an expansion and development of QP,s gas
treatment capacity alongside the fractionation and treatment facilities
in Mesaieed. All of these plants are directly adjacent to the port
facilities, and a major incident at any of them could effectively shut
down port operations.
¶8. (S/NF) The QP subsidiary Qatar Aluminum Company
(QATALUM) plant currently under construction at Mesaieed is planned as
the world,s largest aluminum production facility once completed and
operational (circa 2011). In addition, subsidiary Qatar Chemical
Company (QChem) plans to begin construction on the world,s largest
chemical derivatives plant, and there are plans for a construction of
a new Qatar Petroleum oil refinery, the Al Shaheen refinery, to fully
satisfy internal consumption needs and begin export of refined product
at a greater price than traditional crude export. Construction
on both of these projects at Mesaieed was slated to begin in 2009, but
has since been delayed due to the current economic downturn and high
costs of building materials.
¶9. (C) Dukhan industrial city currently accounts for the majority of
Qatar,s oil production. The destruction or disruption of
production at Dukhan would have a severe impact on the Qatari economy
and may affect global and U.S. economies.
--------------
USG ENGAGEMENT
--------------
¶10. (C/NF) Embassy Doha and the State Department have continued to
identify Qatar's increasingly important role as a world producer in
the oil and LNG sectors and its inherent high value as a potential
terrorism target as points of concern. Qatar's expectation of
becoming the world's LNG and gas-to-liquids (GTL) leader by 2012
necessitates a comprehensive energy infrastructure security program.
Post assesses that Qatar's attention to energy infrastructure has
improved since the previous CI/KR report, but is far from complete.
While the Qataris have adequately planned a production and shipping
infrastructure for the booming business, it appears they are still in
the beginning stages to consider how to protect it. However,
recent overtures made by the Director of Qatar Petroleum,s Industrial
Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior Brigadier Abdulaziz
Al-Ansari, to increased dialogue and cooperation have renewed Post,s
efforts to engage GOQ officials on critical energy infrastructure
security.
¶11. (C) Post has a DCM-led working group comprising Pol/Econ, DAO,
GRPO, OMC, FCS, and RSO to lay the ground work for, and synchronize,
engagement with the GOQ on critical infrastructure protection.
This group met most recently to discuss results of the mid-March 2009
U.S. Coast Guard International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) team
visit to Ras Laffan, Mesaieed and Doha ports. The team
recommended a reciprocal Qatari visit to a U.S. port in June 2009, as
well as the possible establishment of a bilateral security agreement
with Qatar specifically addressing dedicated LNG shipments between the
two countries. Post also wishes to restart the engagement
process with the Qataris on the DOS/DOE Critical Energy Infrastructure
program (CEIP) based on recent, positive signals from the host
government.
¶12. (C) In addition, Post through the Department of Energy,s
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Second Line of
Defense Office, has been working with the Qatari Ministry of
Environment,s Department of Nuclear Energy and Radiological Protection
to provide training and equipment selection for Qatar's nascent
radiological detection and response program since April 2008. In July
2008, Qatar sent 10 mid- to senior level personnel from the Ministry of
Interior, Qatar State Security, Internal Security Force and Qatar
Petroleum Security to a workshop on nuclear detection and monitoring at
the HAMMER facility at the Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) in
Washington state. Qatar intends to place vehicle and pedestrian
radiological and nuclear material detection monitors at ports in Ras
Laffan, Mesaieed and Doha, as well as Doha International Airport and the
land border crossing with Saudi Arabia at Abu Samra.
¶13. (S/NF) Post is formatting a detailed multifaceted response on a
way forward in our efforts to engage Qatar that would leverage the
various agencies of the country team (septel). This response
will address a three-prong approach to various Qatari governmental and
energy-related organizations featuring political/economic engagement,
military to military training and assistance with the Qatari Armed
Forces and Ministry of Interior, and the leveraging of commercial
contacts with Qatar Petroleum and the Ministry of Energy. Post
will be preparing a plan bringing together each of the various threads
of this engagement.
-------------------------
U.S./QATARI JOINT EFFORTS
-------------------------
¶14. (C/NF) As a result of an S/CT and DS/ATA June 2007 visit, Post
drafted a joint working group framework to continue dialogue on energy
infrastructure security. To date, the GOQ has been slow in
embracing the framework agreement; however, Post, Department and USG
concerns have not fallen on deaf ears. GOQ officials have
expressed their own concerns, identifying a risk associated with
critical infrastructure, during meetings with Post officials and USG
visitors since early 2007. In January 2009 meetings with Qatar
Petroleum Security,s Brigadier Al-Ansari and Poloff Zebley, Al-Ansari
indicated he had received a read-out of the November 2007 USG-GOQ
sponsored Gulf Security Dialogue from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and wanted to discuss further cooperation with the USG. Al-Ansari, who
concurrently serves as the number three uniformed member of the Ministry
of Interior as MOI Director of Logistics, appears to be the key
decision maker on all critical industrial infrastructure issues at our
identified key facilities ) Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed
Industrial City.
¶15. (C) The Qatari government's appreciation of U.S. training and
technology presents numerous prospects for U.S. engagement. We
know that Qatar will need trainers, assistance on selection of
physical security equipment (such as delta pop-up barriers, fences and
anti-vehicle berms), nonlethal weapons and tactics, and other
technological equipment (CCTV, etc). Offshore protection is an area
with the greatest potential; Qatar will need additional and more
advanced offshore patrol vessels, plus enhanced maritime surveillance
and communications equipment, weapons and trained crews. There is
currently a lack of standardized security practices; however, the Qatari
government has identified gaps in security infrastructure and has
worked with U.S. and European commercial firms to begin acquisition and
training in the use of technical security equipment.
----------------------
GOQ INTEREST AND PLANS
----------------------
¶16. (S/NF) In 2005, the GOQ contracted with a U.S. security and safety
company to perform a top-down, zero-based review of critical
infrastructure protection; the study encompassed organizational lines of
command and control for the security services and industrial facility
security at the three facilities identified previously. The resultant
report finished by the U.S. company in 2007, which has not been shared
with the USG and remains highly classified by the GOQ, reportedly
identified and prioritized deficient areas and provided recommendations
in each. Subsequent to the report, Qatar Petroleum Security
Directorate placed a tender for a detailed security infrastructure
assessment in March 2009. The assessment will identify needed
technical and security equipment and related facilities (security
control buildings, barricades, etc).
-------------------------------------
Qatari Strategic Security Initiatives
-------------------------------------
¶17. (S) As detailed in the Ref C January 2008 meeting between
Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Kevin Kolevar and Minister of
State for Energy and Industry Mohammed Saleh Al-Sada, the Heir Apparent
had established an Industrial Security Steering Committee, under the
Ministry of Interior and headed by Brigadier Al-Ansari, charged with
managing the current nationwide industrial security apparatus and
improving overall security capacity. The creation of the steering
committee was part of the Heir Apparent's strategic security
initiatives, which include the planned establishment of an integrated
National Command Center (NCC) and development of the National Security
Shield (NSS). The NCC would provide coordinated command and control of
security and civil defense units in response to national emergencies,
while the NSS would create a series of interconnected fixed and mobile
radar platforms to identify threats by sea, air and land.
¶18. (S/NF) As of mid-March 2009, the NCC was under the operational
control of the MOI and co-located at Camp Duheil with the MOI,s Police
Training Center. The center was staffed 24/7 by various Qatari
civil defense, heath and security organizations and maintained direct
contact with Qatar Petroleum Security officials.
¶19. (S/NF) In February 2009, the NSS placed a tender for the
construction of the first-phase of the NSS, which consisted of the
construction of 18 80-meter metal lattice towers for placement of
integrated European Aeronautics, Defense, and Space Corporation (EADS)
radars for interlocking coverage along the land border with Saudi
Arabia and coasts. However, Post has been unable to ascertain
specifics on the radar system and/or the ultimate Qatari organization
responsible for management of the program, even though, select
coverage provided by the NSS would be shared with Qatar Petroleum
Security and integrated within the NCC.
¶20. (S/NF) The Qatar Armed Forces have for several years been
considering adopting an integrated air defense system that could
include the Patriot PAC-3 missile system. The Qatar Armed Forces
have made clear that a major purpose of an air defense system would be
the protection of their critical energy infrastructure. To that
end, the Qataris have asked us to explore ways in which the coverage
area for U.S. military-controlled Patriots currently in Qatar could be
expanded to include the LNG facilities at Ras Laffan. Qatar's interest
in an air defense system presents another opportunity for U.S.-Qatar
engagement on critical infrastructure protection. LeBaron
