Reference ID: 07BAGHDAD1157
Created: 2007-04-04 09:09
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO4018
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1157/01 0940922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040922Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0536
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITYWednesday, 04 April 2007, 09:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001157
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/01/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SA, IR, SY, IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI WELCOMES AMBASSADOR, DISCUSSES ARAB SUMMIT, BAGHDAD
SECURITY, DE-BA’ATH
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker per 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari March 31 to present his credentials. They
discussed Talabani’s trip to Riyadh for the Arab Summit and the side
meetings he held with other Arab leaders, including a discussion on Kirkuk
and the PKK with Turkish PM Erdogan. Talabani claimed that the Baghdad
security initiative was going well and had successfully brought in the
Sunnis. He also expressed his willingness to meet with resistance leaders.
He said that the Presidency, PM, and SCIRI leader Hakim had approved the
compromise draft de-Ba’athification law which he said had been forwarded
to the Council of Representatives. Talabani has written a letter to Iran
asking for the release of the British sailors but received no response. The
President was mentally sharp and growing in strength, although by the end of
the meeting he was showing signs of fatigue. END SUMMARY.
-------
Welcome
-------
¶2. (C) Talabani welcomed the Ambassador and expressed his conviction that
he and Iraq and are real friends of the U.S. He said Iraq and the U.S. were
partners in the fight for democracy and against dictatorship. He made
apologies for not meeting the Ambassador the day before, blaming his staff
of overprotecting him and failing to tell him of the request for a meeting.
He said he is prepared to meet with the Ambassador at any time and invited
him to a meal in the near future.
¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Talabani he was glad to be back in Iraq and
praised Talabani’s efforts to build a relationship with the U.S. He said
he would do everything in his power to support democracy and prosperity in
Iraq. He thanked Talabani for his help on a number of important issues,
including de-Ba’athification and hydrocarbons. He said the U.S. is here to
support Iraqi policy. The FM Zebari echoed this sentiment, saying that the
Iraqi people need to understand that these are Iraqi goals.
-----------
Arab Summit
-----------
¶4. (C) Talabani said he “explained everything� in his speech to the
Arab League. He spoke of the liberation of Iraq and how Coalition troops
were welcomed by the Iraqi people in 2003, but lamented the passage of UN
Resolution 1483. In response to King Abdullah’s negative comments about
the US’s “illegal occupation� of Iraq, he thanked coalition forces and
called for a resolution condemning terrorist activities. He told the League
they cannot be divided, they must all be working for reconciliation. He said
Iraq was proud to be independent and did not follow the dictates of
countries to the east and north (alluding to Iran and Turkey). He claimed
that the Iraqi Shia were independent from Iran and explained to the League
that oil is a national asset shared by all Iraqis and difficulties in this
area will be worked out.
¶5. (C) Talabani said in his side meeting with Amr Mousa, Secretary General
of the Arab League, he criticized the
SIPDIS exclusion of crimes and terrorism taking place in Iraq in the
Secretary General’s report, to which Mousa responded that he
SIPDIS would add it. He said he also had private meetings with the kings of
Jordan and Saudi Arabia and with Turkish PM Erdogan, whom he invited to send
a delegation to Kirkuk to examine the situation and prove that Turkomen are
not being treated poorly. He told Erdogan that Kirkuk is a cultural issue
that cannot be decided by strong words from both sides. He expressed
bemusement that Erdgoan still thought of him and KRG President Massoud
Barzani as tribal chiefs. He told Erdogan that he and the KRG condemn any
terrorist activity against Turkey, to which Erdogan responded positively. On
the PKK issue he told Erdogan tat currently Iraq had to devote all its
resources to securing Baghdad, but he said PKK activity is against the
interests of the Kurdish people.
¶6. (C) He also spoke with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Riyadh and
asked him why they had seen no results from their agreement to cooperate on
security matters made when Talabani visited in January. He said Assad
promised to begin cooperating.
---------------------------
BSP and Sunni Participation
---------------------------
¶7. (C) According to Talabani, the Baghdad security initiative has been
successfully implemented in a way that
BAGHDAD 00001157 002 OF 002
targets not just Sunni areas, but all parts of the city. He said even Iran
was cooperating in some ways by directing the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
militia to cease targeting Sunnis. This will reduce sectarian tensions, he
said. Iran had also stopped helping Thar-Allah, a Shia militia group in the
south, according to Talabani.
¶8. (C) He said the situation was much better than a few months ago,
referencing the PM’s involvement of the Sunnis in the security plan.
Talabani said he hoped that the Ambassador’s arrival was another step
forward in this regard.
¶9. (C) He said before his illness he had a discussion with the PM on steps
to reach out to Sunni parties within the GOI. They agreed on the need
for regular meetings between the Presidency and the PM, as well as regular
PCNS meetings. He said the Presidency must also hold regular meetings to
coordinate on the issues. He said it was vital for them to be on the same
page in the fight against terrorism or at least to use the same language so
that they do not send confusing messages to the press and public.
---------------------------------
Reconciliation/De-Ba’athification
---------------------------------
¶10. (C) Talabani said they are continuing their efforts for national
reconciliation and told the Ambassador that the people are forming groups to
fight terrorism and cooperating with government forces against the
terrorists. He said he has been contacted by members of the national
resistance movement and reported that before traveling to Riyadh he met with
the UK Ambassador to Iraq and the ranking UK General in Iraq and discussed
meeting with members of the resistance.
¶11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Talabani for his critical role in
reconciliation efforts and inquired on the status of the draft
de-Ba’athification law. Talabani told him that it had been sent to the
Council of Representatives (CoR) for debate and approval (Note: according to
Embassy contacts at the CoR they have not yet received it and it is with the
Council of Ministers. End Note). Talabani said that the PM had signed the
draft law for the government and he had signed in the name of the Presidency
because the two Vice-Presidents were out of the country but had given him
their approval. He said he announced the law at the Arab Summit where it was
received with approval. He also discussed the draft law with SCIRI leader
Abdelaziz al-Hakim and Hummam Hammudi, SCIRI CoR member and Foreign
Relations Committee Chair, who were with him at the Summit as
“houseguests� and who he claimed both approved it.
-----------------
British Detainees
-----------------
¶12. (C) Talabani said he wrote a letter to the president of Iran which
called for the release of the British sailors. In it, he told the Iranians
that the Shat al-Arab is important and the Brits were trying to prevent
smuggling. He dispatched an envoy to deliver the letter but the envoy
returned empty-handed - the Iranians want an apology from the United
Kingdom. Talabani added that the Iranians were concerned about his health,
joking that the one thing that the US and Iran have in common is concern for
“the health of Talabani.�
¶13. (C) Comment: Talabani appeared tired and seemed to have more
difficulty than usual speaking English. His staff, probably concerned for
his health, had refused to schedule any meetings for March 30. CROCKER
