Reference ID: 09BAGHDAD2562
Created: 2009-09-24 03:03
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVEC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD
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SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS NEIGHBORS, PART
I
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (U) This is the first of two cables reviewing Iraq’s relations with
key neighboring states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey, in
the wake of the August 19 bombings. Part II reviews Iraq’s relations with
Syria, in the wake of the August 19 bombings.
¶2. (C) Summary: Iraq’s relations with its neighbors represent a critical
element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and normalize its
position in the Gulf and the broader region. While Iraq made substantial
progress in 2008-09 on these fronts, there remained unfinished business,
especially in terms of relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria. The
August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension Iraq’s improving
relations with its neighbors -- represent a serious setback to that progress
and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in
particular now view those earlier gains as “reversible.� Iraq views
relations with Saudi Arabia as among its most challenging, given Riyadh’s
money, deeply ingrained anti-Shia attitudes, and suspicions that a Shia-led
Iraq will inevitably further Iranian regional influence. Iraqi contacts
assess that the Saudi goal (and that of most other Sunni Arab states, to
vary degrees) is to enhance Sunni influence, dilute Shia dominance and
promote the formation of a weak and fractured Iraqi government.
Coincidentally, Iranian efforts are driven by a clear determination to see a
sectarian, Shia-dominated government that is weak, disenfranchised from its
Arab neighbors, detached from the U.S. security apparatus and strategically
dependent on Iran. Neither of these objectives is in the U.S. interest. In
the longer term, we will need to flesh out ideas for a post-GCC security
architecture that includes Iraq more fully, develops ways to contain Iranian
regional influence, and shapes the special position Iraq will likely occupy
in the Gulf in ways that further our interests and those of our Gulf
partners. End Summary.
SAUDI ARABIA -- ANTI-SHIISM AS FOREIGN POLICY?
--------------------------------------------- -
¶3. (C) Iraqi officials view relations with Saudi Arabia as among their
most problematic, although they are usually careful with U.S. officials to
avoid overly harsh criticism, given our close relations with the Saudis.
Iraqi officials note that periodic anti-Shia outbursts from Saudi religious
figures are often allowed to circulate without sanction or disavowal from
the Saudi leadership. This reality reinforces the Iraqi view that the Saudi
state religion of Wahabbi Sunni Islam condones religious incitement against
Shia. The suspicion is that these anti-Shia attitudes color Saudi views of a
Shia-led Iraq. The Saudis have traditionally viewed Iraq as a
Sunni-dominated bulwark against the spread of Shiism and Iranian political
influence. In the wake of bombings in predominantly Shia areas across the
country in June 2009 that killed dozens, PM Maliki pointed publicly to one
such statement, made by a Saudi imam in May, and noted, “We have observed
that many governments have been suspiciously silent on the fatwa provoking
the killing of Shiites.�
¶4. (C) For now the Saudis are using their money and media power
XXXXXXXXXXXX to support Sunni political aspirations, exert influence over
Sunni tribal groups, and undercut the Shia-led Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq (ISCI) and Iraqi National Alliance (INA). NSC advisor QIraq (ISCI) and
Iraqi National Alliance (INA). NSC advisor Safa al-Sheikh told us recently
that Saudi influence in Iraq was significant, perhaps more significant than
Iran’s at the moment, given the financial and media assets at its
disposal, and given Iran’s recent internal distractions. He described the
Saudi “media message� as having shifted a few years ago from one that
was hostile to the GOI and sympathetic to the insurgency, to one that
focused now more on an anti-ISCI message. According to PM Advisor Sadiq
al-Rikabi, the Saudis are opposed to a strong Shia-led INA. Al-Sheikh also
assessed that the Saudis would try to curb ISCI and INA and throw support to
Sunni groups to counter Iranian influence, steps that could end up
indirectly supporting Maliki, if he continues to pursue a cross-sectarian
coalition in the elections. These contacts assess that the Saudi goal (and
to varying degrees most other Sunni states) is to enhance Sunni influence,
dilute Shia dominance, and promote the formation of a weak and more
fractured Iraqi government. (COMMENT: Coincidentally, Iran also sees as in
its interest a weak Iraqi government, albeit one with Shia firmly in
control.)
¶5. (C) Some observers see a more malign Saudi influence. A recent Iraqi
press article quoted anonymous Iraqi intelligence sources assessing that
Saudi Arabia was leading a Gulf effort to destabilize the Maliki government
and was
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financing “the current al Qaida offensive in Iraq.� The article also
quoted MP Haidar al-Abadi, a Maliki political ally, insisting that Gulf Arab
neighbors wanted to destabilize Iraq. A few of our more senior contacts hint
at similar malign intentions “by some neighbors,� making clear without
being explicit that they are referring to Saudi Arabia.
KUWAIT: RELATIONS HOSTAGE TO CHAPTER VII CONCERNS
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶6. (C) Although Kuwait re-opened its Embassy and sent an ambassador in
2008, bilateral relations remain hostage to Chapter VII concerns. While the
Kuwaitis have indicated some willingness to reduce significantly the amount
of compensation Iraq is paying under UNSCR 687, they have insisted in return
on GOI re-affirmation in its entirety of UNSCR 833, entailing acceptance of
the land borders and maritime boundary between the two countries. The latter
in particular is highly problematic for the Iraqi leadership, especially in
an election year, according to senior contacts. At present, Iraq has
unimpeded navigational access from the Gulf to the port of Um Qasr, but some
two-thirds of the deep water channel of the Khor Abdullah now lies -- as a
result of the 833 demarcation -- in Kuwaiti territorial waters. Some
observers, such as Da’wa Party MP Sami al-Askari, have expressed concern
to us that after U.S. forces withdraw fully, Kuwait will try to control
Iraq’s access to the sea, “and that border demarcation will allow it.�
In his view, “No Iraqi leader could ever formally recognize the maritime
border.� Even PM Maliki believes this. Despite these difficulties, the
Iraqi and Kuwaiti sides have made significant progress cooperating in the
past six months on Kuwaiti missing persons and property. NSC advisor
al-Sheikh believes that the Chapter VII issues with Kuwait will eventually
be resolved and that “we do not consider Kuwait a problem country� like
some of the other neighbors. Nevertheless, the border issue is an acute
friction point and could, in the view of Maliki, become grounds for
confrontation between the two.
IRAN’S LOOMING PRESENCE
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Iranian influence in Iraq remains pervasive, as Tehran manipulates
a range of levers to mold Iraq’s political, religious, social, and
economic landscape. Overall, however, the GOI views its relations with Iran
in a special category, posing risks that are manageable and not viewed as
existential threats to the state. Obviously many Sunni contacts -- and many
of our allies in the region -- see the situation in far starker terms and
fear that Iraq could fall into Iran’s political orbit and rendered unable
to speak or act independently, once U.S. troops draw down. Iranian efforts
are driven by a clear determination to see a sectarian, Shia-dominated
government that is weak, disenfranchised from its Arab neighbors, detached
from the U.S. security apparatus and strategically dependent on Iran.
¶8. (C) While significantly weaker than the Saudis and others on media, the
Iranians fund political parties and key individuals (as other neighboring
countries do), according to a range of well-informed Iraqi contacts. Shia
contacts like PM advisor Rikabi and NSC advisor al-Sheikh, as well as others
such as (Kurdish) FM Zebari, do not dismiss the significant Iranian
influence but instead argue that it:
-- is best countered by Iraqi Shia political actors, who know how to deal
with Iran;
-- is not aimed, unlike that of some Sunni Arab neighbors, at fomenting
terrorism that would destabilize the government; Qfomenting terrorism that
would destabilize the government;
-- will naturally create nationalistic Iraqi resistance to it (both Shia and
more broadly), if other outsiders do not intervene to stoke Sunni-Shia
sectarian tension; and
-- has been frozen in place to some extent in the past few months by the
political turmoil inside Iran.
¶9. (C) According to al-Sheikh, Iraq and Iran have “very special, very
frank talks� in which Iraq’s Shia-led government is able to push back
effectively against Iranian influence on some fronts. Observers generally
credit the Iranians with playing a more sophisticated game than the Syrians,
as they try to shape the political process to their liking. These contacts
acknowledge that Iran is providing some form of covert support to armed
groups like the Promise Day Brigades and other small groups, but maintain
they have stopped support for the big militias. It should be noted that some
contacts demonstrate discomfort when asked about Iranian influence and show
an alacrity for moving on to other
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neighbors in the region. TURKEY: BETTER THAN THE REST
----------------------------
¶10. (C) Relations with Turkey are relatively positive. Turkey intervened
diplomatically to attempt to mediate the post-August 19 crisis with the
Syrians, and unlike the Iranian effort, seems to have gotten some traction
with the parties. The effort has been well-received here, even if concrete
progress has been limited. The Iraqis and Turks have established a Strategic
Commission that meets periodically at the ministerial level, paving the way
for head of state visits marking significant economic cooperation. PM
Erdogan is expected in Baghdad in October, following up on the ministerial
in mid-September in Ankara. Bilateral trade is currently at $7 billion
annually, and the two countries hope it will expand significantly in the
coming decade. Moreover, Turkey has worked to improve its relations with the
KRG, and they have significantly increased their diplomatic and commercial
presence in the Kurdish areas. However, the Turks also have been active on
the Iraqi political front, funding groups like the Mosul-based Sunni
Al-Hudba movement, in an effort to offset Kurd influence in areas outside
Kurdistan.
¶11. (C) It is the water issue that threatens to complicate an improving
Iraq-Turkey relationship. According to DFM Labid Abbawi, Iraq needs a flow
of 700 cubic meters of water for its needs but could get back with a minimum
of 500. However, Turkey was only allowing a flow of about 230 cubic meters
(with an uptick in August and September beyond that level). A recent visit
to Turkey by the Iraqi Minister of Water was not very productive, he noted.
THE WAY FORWARD
---------------
¶12. (C) It will help Iraq’s efforts to maintain stability and security,
and to continue moving forward in normalization with neighbors, if we and
the P-5 can provide the requisite support for the appointment by the UN of a
senior official (someone other than SRSG head Melkert, who already has a
full plate with UNAMI) to look into the August 19 bombings. We should also
weigh in with key neighbors to urge a redoubling of efforts in normalizing
relations with Iraq, keeping up the pressure on Egypt and Saudi Arabia in
particular to return their Ambassadors. We should also caution Iraq’s Arab
neighbors against efforts to inflame Shia-Sunni anxieties through their
support for Sunni parties and by Shia-critical media attacks. Regarding
Kuwait, we will need to work for steady progress on Chapter VII where
possible, focusing on Oil-for-Food and WMD resolutions 1546 and 707,
initially, with a push after elections to make progress on the
Kuwait-related resolutions.
¶13. (C) In the longer term, we will need to flesh out ideas for a post-GCC
security architecture that includes Iraq more fully, develops ways to
contain Iranian regional influence, and shapes the special position Iraq
will likely occupy in the Gulf in ways that further our interests and those
of our Gulf partners. The challenge for us is to convince Iraq neighbors,
particularly the Sunni Arab governments, that relations with a new Iraq are
not a zero-sum game, where if Iraq wins, they lose. We still have work to do
to convince them that a strong, stable, democratic (and inevitably Shia-led)
Iraq is the best guarantee that Iraq will be able to shake Iranian
manipulation and see its future bound up with that of the West and its
moderate Arab neighbors.
HILL
